As robber-bombers keep blasting bank teller machines (ATMs) with unprecedented frequency across SA, security analysts are growing increasingly concerned at the ease with which the bombers are able to obtain the mining explosives used in most bombings.
They fear that such explosives could become a means of attack in other forms of armed robbery, from cash heists to shopping centre raids and house-breaking, with greater threat to life and limb.
In the first five months of this year, 148 ATM blasts were carried out across SA - an average of one a day, and nearly three times the number in all of 2006 - unprecedented for such a length of time.
Security officials say mines and state regulators must tighten explosives controls urgently. But police and mining officers are sceptical that tighter controls would stamp out the explosives black-market pipeline.
Analysis of the ATM bombings has revealed that:
- Nearly all of the blasts involved explosives used in deep-level mining;
- Most of the bombers are amateurs and copy-cats, knowing little about placing explosives to best effect; and
- Bombings have spread to urban areas, even as far south as Cape Town, after having begun in outlying areas.
The absence of a clear method in most bombings suggests relatively few are linked to organised syndicates; bombers tend to be opportunists. The lack of structure makes it harder to track down and infiltrate bomber cells, which leaves the source of the explosives as the most likely policing departure point.
In January, one month after ATM bombings began accelerating to current levels, the GM for crime risk information of the SA Banking Risk Information Centre, Ian Janse van Vuuren, called on police and mining authorities to tighten explosives regulations.
But that's more easily said than done, says SA Police Services chief inspector of explosives, senior supt Dries van Sittert. SA is one of the biggest global consumers of explosives, using upwards of 65 t /day.
"If you look at the scale and complexity of underground mining - you're working in pitch darkness a lot of the time and there are explosives everywhere - it's practically impossible to prevent someone coming off shift with a detonator or a few sticks," says Van Sittert.
Nevertheless, "control measures on some of the mines are not as good as they should be", says Henry Merrick, safety and security manager at African Explosives (AEL), SA's largest commercial explosives manufacturer.
Controls on production, transportation and storage of bulk explosives and accessories (such as detonators) are well regulated, he says. The breakdown occurs after the detonators and explosive gels have been distributed to the rock face. He should know; AEL conducts the blasting for many SA mines. "If a miner comes out with a few accessories, it won't be missed," says Merrick.
Control standards vary from mine to mine; small mining companies are often least able to maintain controls, he adds.
Vijay Nundlall, chief director of technical support for the department of minerals & energy's (DME) mine health & safety inspectorate agrees that the fault may lie with weak controls at specific mines. "Perhaps some mines are not following the regulations to the letter," he says. "If established systems are carried out fully, the scope for explosives theft would be very limited."
Nundlall says statutory regulations stipulate how miners must account for explosives inventories underground. DME mining inspectors routinely monitor underground activities.
But, as with many specialised professions, the mining inspectorate is 15%-20% understaffed, so it is virtually impossible to monitor all mining activities. Also, the system of random checks of miners entering and leaving the mines is not always adequate. "But, one has to look at the entire chain of explosives, from production, through transport and storage at a mine to establish where weaknesses may be," he says.
Nationally, the dispersal of regulation is a problem. At least four state authorities are tasked with regulating different parts of the explosives chain, though they do co-ordinate efforts through a joint co-ordinating forum: the DME is responsible for explosives deployed underground in mines; the police are responsible for security issues above ground and for transportation of explosives in conjunction with the department of transport; while the department of labour's Explosives Council monitors the production, handling and storage of explosives in non mining workplaces.
Further complicating matters is the fact that regulation falls under three different laws: the Explosives Act of 1956, the Occupational Health & Safety Act of 1993 and the Mines Health & Safety Act of 1996.
The Explosives Act is under review; a draft is out for comment, proposing extensive changes in the way explosives are transported and stored. The amendments do not appear to do much to toughen controls on explosives use within the mining environment.
The occupational health & safety regulations are aimed mainly at explosives in non mining environments.
Merrick says the variety of applications of explosives warrants the variety of laws, "however, there is a need to have one set of rules for the explosives business; that will make things easier in every way".
Mining companies are understandably wary of discussing the explosives regulation issue. A spokesman for a leading gold mining company agreed to speak on condition his company was not identified, and admitted that though the mines tried to regulate explosives use - mainly for cost reasons - "skimming (of explosives) is entirely possible".
But he, like other commentators, pointed out that "even if the mines do tighten up controls on explosives, what's to stop somebody manufacturing their own explosives from ingredients they can buy anywhere in the agricultural and chemical industries?"
